

**VENEZUELA'S HUGO CHÁVEZ, BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM,  
AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE**

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## FOREWORD

This monograph comes at a time when the U.S. and Venezuelan governments are intensifying an ongoing series of acrimonious charges and countercharges. Each country has argued repeatedly that the other is engaged in a political-economic-military struggle for Western Hemisphere hegemony. On a more personal level, the United States maintains that President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela is playing a destabilizing role in the region, and is compromising the quality of democracy and the exercise of power in Venezuela and other parts of the Americas. Chávez rebuts that the only destabilizing factor in the hemisphere is President George W. Bush, and that democracy and power long since have been perverted by American capitalists and local elites for their own purposes. And the U.S.-Venezuelan verbal sparing match continues unabated.

The author's intent is to explain who Hugo Chávez is, where it appears that he is going, and how he intends to get there; and the implications for democracy and stability in Latin America. He concludes that—in the worst case—Chávez is developing the conceptual and physical bases for an asymmetric "Super Insurgency."

This timely monograph contributes significantly to an understanding of the new kinds of threats characteristic of a world in which instability and irregular conflict are no longer on the margins of global politics. For those responsible for making and implementing national security policy in the United States, the rest of the Western Hemisphere, and elsewhere in the world, this analysis is compelling. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as part of the ongoing debate on global and regional security and stability.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.  
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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

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## SUMMARY

The author of this monograph answers questions regarding “Who is Hugo Chávez?” “What is the basis of Chávez’s *bolivarianismo*?” “What is the context that defines Bolivarian threats?” “How does Chávez define contemporary asymmetric warfare, and what are the key components of success?” “How can the innumerable charges and countercharges between the Venezuelan and U.S. governments be interpreted?” And “What are the implications for democracy and stability in Latin America?”

His conclusions are, first, that Hugo Chávez might be a military caudillo, but he is no “nut case.” He is, in fact, what Ralph Peters calls a “wise competitor.” Second, as such, he will not even attempt to defeat his enemies on their own terms. Rather, he will seek to shift the playing field away from conventional military confrontations and turn to nontraditional forms of assault on a nation’s stability and integrity. Third, as a consequence, it is important to understand that Chávez understands that every player in the international community from small powers to the U.S. superpower must cope simultaneously with four levels of contemporary threat. Accordingly, all the types of threats in those four levels of conflict are seen as methods of choice—or areas for exploitation—for any commercial, ideological, or other movement that is dedicated to achieving control or radical change in a given nation-state. Fourth, Chávez understands that asymmetric warfare is the methodology of the weak against the strong. He understands that this type of conflict requires more than weaponry and technology. It requires lucid and incisive thinking, resourcefulness, determination, imagination, and a certain disregard for convention. Chávez considers three issues to be key to success (or failure) in contemporary asymmetric conflict. They are closely related to *bolivarianismo*’s security scheme, social programs, and communications efforts. In these terms, he understands the sophistication and complexity of war as a whole. He also understands the value of facilitating the processes of state failure to achieve his objectives of establishing socialism for the 21st century, economic and political integration, and Latin American *grandeza* (greatness). And Chávez understands the centrality of

relative moral legitimacy in conflict—and the critical importance of creating popular perceptions that his cause is morally correct, and will lead to a better life for all.

Finally, taken all together, this is “war as a whole,” or what Chávez calls “*Guerra de todo el pueblo*” (interchangeably: war of all the people, asymmetric, fourth-generation, or irregular war). At a minimum, Chávez and Venezuela are developing the conceptual and physical capability to challenge the status quo in Latin America, and to generate a “Super Insurgency” intended to bring about fundamental political and economic change in the region. Thus, as one sees Chávez’s ideas developing and maturing, it is becoming more and more obvious that his *bolivarianismo* is resonating with large numbers of people in Venezuela and the rest of Latin America—and that he should not be taken lightly.

This is the starting point from which to understand where Chávez may be going and how he expects to get there. And it is the starting point from which to understand the side effects that will shape the hemispheric security environment now and for the future. The consequences of failing to take this challenge seriously are clear. Unless thinking, actions, and organization are reoriented at the highest levels to deal with contemporary asymmetric realities, the problems of global, regional, and subregional democracy, stability, and security will resolve themselves—and not likely for the better.

## VENEZUELA'S HUGO CHÁVEZ, BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM, AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Beginning with the election of Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez Frias as President of Venezuela in 1998, the United States and Venezuela have exchanged a continuing series of acrimonious charges and countercharges. Each country has argued repeatedly that the other is engaged in a political-economic-military struggle for Western Hemisphere hegemony. Relatively recently, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega called on the Organization of American States (OAS) to strengthen its *Carta Democrática's* (Democratic Charter) mechanisms to deal more effectively with threats to democracy, stability, and peace in Latin America.<sup>1</sup> In that connection, in testimony before the U.S. Congress in January 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued that President Chávez was minimizing democracy in Venezuela and destabilizing security in the Latin American region.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) supported those arguments and added its concern regarding Venezuelan purchases of large quantities of arms. Then, in February 2005, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Porter Goss put Venezuela at the top of the list of Latin American countries described as "areas of concern," with the potential of playing a destabilizing role in the region.<sup>3</sup> And, again, in May and June 2005, respectively, Assistant Secretary Noriega and Secretary Rice proposed the creation of a mechanism in the OAS that would monitor the quality of democracy and the exercise of power in Latin America.<sup>4</sup>

President Chávez responded to these and similar allegations in February 2005 by saying, "The only destabilizing factor here [in Venezuela] is [U.S. President George W.] Bush."<sup>5</sup> In March 2005, he repeated a familiar theme that the United States intends to assassinate him and prayed for God to "save us" from President Bush and to "save the world from the true threat [the U.S. Colossus of the North]."<sup>6</sup> Additionally, Chávez argued that the intent of his actions was simply to defend the sovereignty and greatness of his country and the region.<sup>7</sup> It is in the context of defending sovereignty and greatness that Chávez consistently returns to the idea of a "Bolivarian

Revolution” (*bolivarianismo*) that is intended to develop the potential of Latin America to achieve Simón Bolívar’s dream of South American political-economic integration and *grandeza* (magnificence), to reduce U.S. hegemony in the region, and to change the geopolitical map of the Western Hemisphere.<sup>8</sup> In that connection, in April 2005, *The Economist* reported that Chávez had met with Cuba’s Fidel Castro and, among other things, proclaimed a 21st century socialist “alternative” to U.S.-style capitalism in the Americas.<sup>9</sup> And, U.S.-Venezuelan verbal sparring continues unabated.

Who is this man, Chávez? How can the innumerable charges and countercharges between the Venezuelan and U.S. governments be interpreted? What are the implications for democracy and stability in Latin America? In an attempt to answer these and related questions, we center our analysis on the contemporary geopolitical conflict context of current Venezuelan “Bolivarian” policy. To accomplish this, a basic understanding of the political-historical context within which Venezuelan national security policy is generated is an essential first step toward understanding the situation as a whole. The second step requires an introductory understanding of Chávez’s concept of 21st century socialism, and the political-psychological-military ways he envisions to achieve it. Then, a “levels of analysis” approach will provide a systematic understanding of the geopolitical conflict options, which have a critical influence on the logic that determines how such a policy as *bolivarianismo* might continue be implemented by Venezuela or any other country in the contemporary world security arena. At the same time, this analysis will provide an understanding of how other countries in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere might begin to respond to *bolivarianismo*’s possible threats. Finally, this is the point from which we can generate strategic-level recommendations for maintaining and enhancing stability in Latin America.<sup>10</sup>

## **THE POLITICAL-HISTORICAL CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH VENEZUELAN NATIONAL SECURITY CHOICES ARE MADE AND IMPLEMENTED**

*Caudillos* (strong men)—including “The Liberator,” Simón Bolívar, himself—dominated Venezuela in a succession of military



dictatorships, from Independence in 1821 to the *coup* against the dictatorship of President Marcos Pérez Jiménez and the subsequent military *junta* in 1958. During that 137-year period, more than 20 constitutions were drafted, promulgated, and ignored. More than 50 armed revolts took their toll of life and property. Political parties meant little and political principles even less. In all, Venezuela exhibited the characteristics of a traditional authoritarian society until the oil industry began to boom after World War II.<sup>11</sup>

### **The Period from World War II and the Venezuelan Commitment to Democracy.**

Beginning with the elections of 1958 that followed the military *junta*, Venezuelans began to elect their political leadership. However, their concept of democracy was not derived from the Anglo-American tradition of limited state power and strong individual human rights. Rather, the current tradition of Venezuelan democracy has its roots firmly in the outcome of the French Revolution, and subsequent perversions of the Rousseauian concept of “total” (totalitarian) democracy, wherein the individual surrenders his rights and personal interests to the state in return for the strict enforcement of social harmony and the General Will.<sup>12</sup> Prior to the French Revolution, kings ruled by “Divine Right” and were sovereign. With the revolution, however, sovereignty was shifted from the king to the nation-state. Thus, the state enjoys absolute power – through the enforcement of Rousseau’s General Will – as an essential right.<sup>13</sup>

As a result, the modern political forces set in motion by a robust oil economy produced an experiment in democracy that was tempered by a strong centralized government. That government included a corporatist executive authority and security apparatus organized to direct and control the political and economic life of the country.<sup>14</sup> In this context, the Venezuelan political system has been built on a pact among members of the elites, under which the dominant political parties and their “caudilloistic” leaders have been the principal actors. As Robespierre did after the French Revolution, contemporary Venezuelan political actors determine what they believe is best for themselves and for all citizens (e.g., the General

Will). Thus, the Venezuelan state controls the wealth produced by its petroleum and other industries, and is the principal distributor of the surpluses generated in a highly regulated and subsidized economy. In that connection, to one extent or another—and some more than others—all the people and every enterprise in Venezuela feed off what has been called the *piñata* (a suspended breakable pot filled with candies for children’s parties) of the state treasury.<sup>15</sup>

The political turmoil that has been generated in Venezuela and other parts of Latin America by recent political and economic transition that challenges comfortable “status quos,” or does not satisfy the expectations of the people, opens the way to serious stability problems. In these conditions—and given an authoritarian Latin American political tradition—ambitious political leaders find it easy to exploit popular grievances to catapult themselves into power—and stay there. The success of these leaders stems from solemn promises made directly to the masses to solve national and individual problems without regard to slow, obstructive, and corrupted democratic processes. Thus, through mass mobilization, supporting demonstrations, and subtle and not-so-subtle coercion, demagogic populist leaders are in a position to claim a mandate to place themselves above elections, political parties, legislatures, and courts—and govern as they see fit.<sup>16</sup> This becomes a national and hemispheric security issue—and possible threat—when a population becomes radicalized by a leader who uses direct violence and indirect coercion to achieve his political objectives.<sup>17</sup>

### **The Post-1992 “Crisis of Governance” and Two Related Security Issues.**

The political-economic-social turmoil that has surrounded Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolution since his nearly successful military coup in February 1992 to the present time is instructive. The imprisonment of Chávez for his role in a 1992 *coup* attempt, his subsequent release, his overwhelming victory in gaining the presidency of the Republic in 1998, the riots and near overthrow of his government in 2002, the referendum of 2004 that confirmed him in office, and his expected success in the upcoming elections of

2006 dramatically illustrate a struggle for reform and an expression of popular frustration with the failures of previous “democratically elected” governments.<sup>18</sup> Many Venezuelan citizens and foreign observers expected those governments to move Venezuela to a more open polity, economic development, civil peace, and individual prosperity. Instead, those governments stagnated. They remained as closed as ever, meaningful development failed to take place, political turmoil and limited violence prevailed, and ordinary people continued to live in relative poverty. In that environment, corporatism, crony capitalism, and authoritarianism grew – along with a widespread disillusionment with “democracy.”<sup>19</sup>

The post-1992 “crisis of governance,” during which the state was unable or unwilling to provide for the legitimate needs and desires of the Venezuelan people, “opened the doors of power to the left,” and to caudilloistic populists such as Chávez, who “reinforce their radical positions by inflaming anti-U.S. sentiment.”<sup>20</sup> In turn, several other issues have been exposed that relate closely to hemispheric civil-military relations and regional stability. Only two of those issues will be examined here: first, the Venezuelan reaction to “globalization,” and, second, the issue of governance and the role of the armed forces.

*Globalization and Fractured Society.* In addition to the U.S. policy of “democratic enlargement” in Latin America, globalization is also focusing people on the concept of transparent and accountable democracy. The rapid change that has taken place in the world since the end of the Cold War has challenged traditional closed political practices, social structures, cultural mores, and business practices. As a result, global economic integration not only has fostered great wealth, but also great disruption and dislocation – and political instability within elites and the masses.<sup>21</sup>

Like all revolutions, globalization represents a shift of power from one group to another. In most countries, including Venezuela, it involves a possible power shift from the state and its bureaucrats to the private sector and its entrepreneurs. As this happens, all those who derive their income and status from positions in governing political institutions – or subsidies from the governmental *piñata* – have two choices. They can become winners if they take some

chances in adapting to the global world, or they can become losers if they do not further entrench themselves in the highly regulated and guaranteed economy. This includes managers and cronies who have been awarded monopolies by the state, as well as ordinary people who rely on the state for cheap gas, foodstuffs, and other consumer goods.<sup>22</sup>

As a consequence, globalization also means possible fundamental change in “quality of life” for important sectors of the society and possible social disintegration, as various sectors contend with each other in the very personal struggle for survival in an unguaranteed economy. At the same time, this struggle between those sectors who would and would not take the chances involved in changing the basic economic status quo means a possible dilemma for the armed forces. This issue and the one below center on the fact that many poorer Venezuelans see President Chávez as their savior and champion in an impoverished and failing country. Other Venezuelans – especially from the middle classes – see Chávez as an altogether more sinister figure. They see him replacing democracy with autocracy and a mildly socialistic economy with something close to Marxist-Leninist communism.<sup>23</sup>

*Governance and the Role of the Armed Forces.* Whether or not the new globalization rules are unacceptably oppressive and socially disintegrating depends very much on how they are made and enforced. Whether or not governance generates a transparent and viable political competence that can and will manage, coordinate, and maintain social harmony, national well-being, and justice depends, again, on how the rules are made and enforced.<sup>24</sup> This takes us to the idea of responsible governance and the role of the armed forces in Venezuelan politics.

It is important to remember that the Venezuelan armed forces governed the country during the 19th century and through the first half of the 20th century. Since 1958–59, there has been a redefinition of the role of the armed forces to the benefit of responsible democratic influences. That redefinition and transition is, of course, not yet complete. The situation is delicate, and factors that nourish political upheaval and the armed forces’ involvement in it are latent. Thus, it is possible that the military could resume a major role in the 21st century political process.<sup>25</sup>

In that connection, the armed forces of Venezuela have always assumed that they have an obligation to resolve various internal crises. That is, if a governing regime deviates too significantly from the general armed forces' doctrinal concept of social harmony and good of the state, the military will step into the political situation and provide corrective action. As a result, the military institution will have a role in the political process. That role may be either positive or negative—depending on how President Chávez involves the armed forces in the security decisionmaking and implementing processes.<sup>26</sup>

### **Conclusions on the Political-Historical Context in which Venezuelan Security Policy is Generated.**

This takes us to two questions asked earlier. First, "Who is Chávez?" Second, "Given the political-historical context within which President Chávez is pursuing *bolivarianismo*, what are the implications for democracy and stability in Venezuela and the rest of Latin America?" Brazil's former President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, draws from his personal experience and succinctly states his perspective on Chávez and the challenges to Venezuela's and Latin America's democracies in the following terms:

Chávez is in essence the reincarnation of the old *caudillo*. He is populist and salvationist. In this sense, he is very different from Lula (the current Brazilian President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva). Lula is not interested in saving the world . . . [and] Lula has no revolutionary agenda for Brazil or the world. Chávez, in contrast, does have a revolutionary agenda. The problem is that he does not exactly know what it is. It exists only as a slogan called *bolivarianism*, which means nothing and serves only as a base to throw Venezuela's future out the window.

Nothing has changed with Chávez. The country remains basically what it always has been. Venezuela continues to be ruled by a parasitic dominant class dependent on oil. The majority of the people are being fooled, but remain as excluded as ever.

Ultimately, the vitality of Latin America's democracies will depend on . . . the willingness of those who believe in the universal values of liberty to remain vigilant and act decisively against the totalitarian temptations that continue to impoverish the quality of political life and promote the

politics of false hopes. This means combating *caudillismo* in Venezuela . . . and political incompetence in the entire region.<sup>27</sup>

Cardozo and much of the rest of the world were probably right in characterizing Chávez as not much more than a traditional Latin American military *caudillo* – and maybe something of a “nut case.” Since those early evaluations, however, it has become more and more obvious that Chávez and his advisors are developing a doctrine for Bolivarian socialism and Latin American *grandeza*, and defining ways and means of achieving those objectives. That doctrine is not well-defined or completely coherent, but it is resonating with large numbers of people and should not be taken lightly. As a consequence, Cardozo’s warning remains valid – “Ultimately, the vitality of Latin American democracies will depend on . . . combating *caudillismo* in Venezuela . . . and political incompetence in the entire region.”<sup>28</sup> This is the basis and the reality of Chávez’s challenge to the Western Hemisphere. It is the starting point from which to understand specific instances and to develop strategies and principles of action that would either support or attempt to counter *bolivarianismo* – it is two sides of the same proverbial coin.

## **CHÁVEZ’S CONCEPT OF 21st CENTURY SOCIALISM AND HOW TO ACHIEVE IT**

Socialism for the 21st century and the expected regional integration it would engender (*bolivarianismo*) begins with a premise that traditional post-World War II socialist and Marxist-Leninist political-economic models made mistakes, but the theory remains totally valid. The idea is that representative democracy and the U.S.-dominated capitalism of the new global era are total failures. Representative democracy and capitalism serve only elites – not common people. These failures must now be replaced by “participatory democracy,” “direct democracy,” or what detractors have called radical populism. In these terms, Chávez is re-elaborating the concept of democracy and promoting a socialist economic system as two parts of an overarching political model for the Latin American region.<sup>29</sup> As a precautionary note, we must remember that the key concepts and the various implementing programs of this model are works in progress and without established time lines.

## Key Concepts of the “New” Socialism.

According to President Chávez and his advisors, in order to make the Bolivarian project work, it is necessary to implement diverse policies beginning with a “system of power.” That system is intended to ensure internal peace and societal harmony in Venezuela that will—in time—provide the foundations for a Latin American-wide Regional Power Bloc (BRP), and economic and political integration.<sup>30</sup>

The system of power upon which internal and external Bolivarian objectives will be achieved is based on the concept of direct democracy. Importantly, the main tenets dictate that: 1) the new authority in the state must be a leader who communicates directly with the people, interprets their needs, and emphasizes “social expenditure” to guarantee the legitimate needs and desires of the people; 2) elections, Congress, and the courts will provide formal democracy and international legitimacy, but will have no real role in governance or the economy; 3) the state will continue to own or control the major means of national production and distribution; and 4) the national and regional political-economic integration function will be performed by the leader by means of his financial, material, and political-military support of people’s movements.<sup>31</sup>

This takes us to the notion of “Guerra de todo el pueblo” (war of all the people, or people’s war)—asymmetric, fourth-generation, or irregular conflict.<sup>32</sup> Lacking the conventional power to challenge the United States or any of Venezuela’s immediate neighbors, President Chávez seems to have decided that asymmetric conflict is a logical means of expression and self-assertion. It is a concept as old as war itself. This is the methodology of the weak against the strong. The primary characteristic is the use of disparity between the contending parties to gain advantage. Strategic asymmetry has been defined as “acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. It can have both psychological and physical dimensions.”<sup>33</sup> That is, Chávez’s concept of asymmetric conflict involves the organized application of coercive military or nonmilitary, lethal or nonlethal, direct or indirect, or a

mix of various unconventional or irregular methods. This would be a “Super Insurgency” that integrates the fundamental instruments of political, economic, social-moral, informational, and military power. And, like all others, this insurgency is intended to resist, oppose, gain control of, or overthrow an existing government or symbol of power – and bring about fundamental political change.<sup>34</sup>

To further elaborate, this kind of holistic conflict is based primarily on words, images, and ideas. Secondly, it may be based on more traditional military means. More than anything, it is about perceptions, beliefs, expectations, legitimacy, and the political will to attempt such an ill-defined revolutionary vision as *bolivarianismo*. And, the more messianic the vision, the more likely the leader and his followers will remain committed to the use of these political-psychological means to achieve their ends. Thus, this type of asymmetric conflict is not won by seizing specific territory militarily or destroying specific buildings, cities, or industrial capability. It is won by altering the political-psychological factors that are most relevant in a targeted culture.<sup>35</sup>

### **Major Implementing Programs for the “New” Socialism.**

As might be expected of a *caudillo* with limited political experience, programs to implement this vision are numerous, ambitious, vast, and still incomplete. They include, however, three general social, communications, and military/security schemes.

*Social Programs.* To strengthen his personal position and internal power base, President Chávez is spending large amounts of money on an amorphous *Plan Bolívar 2000* that builds and renovates schools, clinics, day nurseries, roads, and housing for the poor. Additionally, Chávez is developing education and literacy outreach programs, agrarian reform programs, and workers’ cooperatives. At the same time, he has established MERCAL, a state company that provides subsidized staple foodstuffs to the poor. Chávez also has imported 16,000 Cuban doctors to help take care of the medical needs of the Venezuelan underclasses. Clearly, these programs offer tangible benefits to the mass of Venezuelans who were generally neglected by previous governments.<sup>36</sup>



*Communications.* The intent, in this effort, is to fabricate mass consensus. *Bolivarianismo* will require maximum media (radio, TV, and newspapers/magazines) support to purvey ideas, develop public opinion, and generate electoral successes. Ample evidence exists that Chávez-controlled media are using emotional arguments to gain attention, exploit real and imagined fears of the population and create outside enemies as scapegoats for internal failings, and to inculcate the notion that opposition to the regime equates to betrayal of the country. And, to help ensure the “irreversibility” of the process for re-establishing Socialism for the 21st century, the Venezuelan penal code has been changed to include criminal penalties for “lack of [regime] respect” and “provoking fear or anxiety in the public.”

President Chávez’s personal involvement in the communications effort is also clear and strong. Reportedly, statements, speeches, and interviews of Chávez are being broadcast throughout Venezuela and the Caribbean Basin at least 4 hours a day, every day on *Television del Sur*.<sup>37</sup>

*The Security Scheme.* First, the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 provides political and institutional autonomy for the armed forces, under the centralized control of the president and commander-in-chief. President Chávez has also created an independent National Police Force, outside the traditional control of the armed forces, which is responsible to the president. At the same time, efforts have gone forward to establish a 1.5 million-person military reserve and two additional paramilitary organizations—the Frente Bolivariano de Liberación (Bolivarian Liberation Front) and the Ejército del Pueblo en Armas (Army of the People in Arms). The armed forces and the police perform traditional national defense and internal security missions, within the context of preparing for what Chávez calls fourth-generation, asymmetric, irregular conflict, or war of all the people. The military reserve and the paramilitary are charged to (1) protect the country from a U.S. and/or Colombian invasion, or resist such an invasion with an Iraqi-style insurgency; and (2) act as armed, anti-opposition forces.<sup>38</sup> The institutional separation of the various security organizations ensures that no one institution can control the others, but the centralization of those institutions under the President ensures his absolute control of security and “social harmony” in Venezuela.<sup>39</sup>

## Conclusions Regarding Chávez's Model for the Achievement of a "New" Socialism.

What President Chávez has achieved by improving the physical well-being of many poor Venezuelans and by continually verbalizing these successes on television and in the press is the formation of a large popular base of support. What he has accomplished by reorganizing the security apparatus of the Venezuelan state is to gain complete control of that apparatus; preclude any political independence, influence, or power it may have had; and give himself instruments of power that he can wield along with others who can make Venezuela a regional power. With this, the full political-military-economic-social-informational power of the Venezuelan state is unified in the singular pursuit of Chávez's strategic objectives.

At a minimum, then, Venezuela may be becoming capable of helping to destabilize large parts of Latin America. The political purpose of any given destabilization effort would be simply to prepare the way to force a radical restructuring of a targeted country and its governance.<sup>40</sup> Venezuelan money, technology, and arms easily could be provided to radical movements and insurgent groups throughout Central and South America. Consider the example of contemporary Bolivia. Over the past 5 years, that country has experienced a series of political-psychological crises in which three presidents have been forced undemocratically to leave office. Most recently, former President Carlos Mesa resigned to defuse large-scale protests organized by powerful populist groups and to avert what he saw as a possible civil war. Nevertheless, opposition leaders refused to allow the next two constitutionally-designated individuals to assume the presidency. Agreement was finally reached when the third-in-line for the presidency—President of the Supreme Court Eduardo Rodríguez—agreed to call quick elections.<sup>41</sup> If Evo Morales, backed by his Movement to Socialism, wins that election (as expected)—or if he follows the pattern of *imposición* used to determine President Mesa's replacement and imposes a new president of his choice—what a *coup* that would be for his newest best friend, Chávez!

This is the basis of the contemporary U.S.-Venezuelan diplomatic charge and countercharge syndrome and the answer to the question

of democracy within the context of *bolivarianismo*. It is the starting point from which to understand where Chávez may be going and how he expects to get there. And, it is the starting point from which to understand the side effects that will shape the security environment for now and the future, in which Latin America and the rest of the hemisphere must struggle and survive. It is also the starting point from which to develop the strategic vision to counter radical populism and *caudillismo*, as well as the instability and chaos they engender. Thus, Noriega may have been right when he argued that the diverse, myriad, nontraditional threats [that Chávez appears to be gravitating toward] can “challenge our democracies and undermine the security and prosperity of our citizens in too many of our states.”<sup>42</sup>

### **THE VENEZUELAN AND HEMISPHERIC STABILITY- SECURITY PROBLEM: A LEVELS OF ANALYSIS APPROACH**

The Latin American mainstream, juridically oriented, “absolutist”<sup>43</sup> security dialogue demonstrates that many political and military leaders and scholars of international relations have not adjusted yet to the reality that internal and transnational nonstate actors can be as important as traditional nation-states in determining global political patterns and outcomes in world affairs. Similarly, many political and military leaders see nonstate actors as bit players in the international security arena. At most, many consider nontraditional actors to be low-level law enforcement problems, and, as a result, many argue that these actors do not require sustained national security policy attention.<sup>44</sup> Yet more than half the countries in the world are struggling to maintain their political, economic, and territorial integrity in the face of diverse direct and indirect nonstate challenges, together with internal and transnational challenges.<sup>45</sup>

Thus, a more realistic, contemporary, nontraditional security dialogue tends to focus on enhancing real and popular perceptions of relative stability and well-being. Stability and well-being tend to refer to the use of a variety of means—only one of which is specifically military—in the pursuit of national and regional security-stability objectives. In turn, enemies can be traditional nation-states, nontraditional external nonstate actors, violent nontraditional intrastate actors, or proxies or surrogates that might

threaten the achievement of those objectives and the vitality of the state. Additionally, the security dialogue in Latin America, and much of the rest of the world, define poverty as an enemy and a threat to national and international stability and security. As a result, the enemy is not necessarily a recognizable military entity or an industrial/technical capability to make war. At base, the enemy now becomes the individual political actor who plans and implements the kind of violence that threatens national well-being and exploits the root causes of instability.<sup>46</sup>

The major trend that permeates the security dialogue involves a slow, generalized move away from the absolutist concept of state security and sovereignty toward a “full spectrum” of closely related national, subnational, and individual political-military and socioeconomic security threats. These threats can lead to radical political change or to the failure of the traditional nation-state. The recognized interdependence of each component of the threat spectrum provides the point from which to develop the strategic vision to escape the intellectual vise-lock of the more restricted juridical definition of national security and sovereignty, and explore the idea of “effective” sovereignty. That is, effective but fair state control of *all* the national territory and the people in it.<sup>47</sup>

In that connection, understanding the components of the spectrum as a holistic conceptual framework provides a more complete vision of the conflict arena and a more substantive comprehension of what Chávez calls war of all the people. But regardless of what the conflict threat is called, the logic of the situation further demonstrates that the conscious choices that the international community and individual nation-states make about how to deal with the broader, more realistic, concept of threat will define the processes of national, regional, and global security and well-being for now and into the future.<sup>48</sup>

### **Perspectives on a Full Spectrum of Threats within the Venezuelan and Latin American Security Environment.**

It would be helpful at the outset, then, to consider the complex security environment with reference to four different levels of analysis—each with a regional (Latin American) corollary, oriented

toward countering a *possible* Venezuelan threat. From that point, contemporary asymmetric conflict and its implications may be examined.

*The First Level.* This is a more or less traditional-legal level of analysis at the nation-state level that involves the potential threat of conventional interstate war. For example, President Chávez has defined Colombia as Venezuela's most critical external threat.<sup>49</sup> Additionally, although remote, an undeniable possibility of interstate war—based on old territorial quarrels—exists between Venezuela and Colombia and between Venezuela and Guyana.<sup>50</sup>

The corollary concerns possible Venezuelan support to ongoing insurgencies and radical populist movements in various Latin American states—and resultant bilateral and multilateral tensions. The corollary also concerns the traditional principle of “nonintervention.” The question, simply put, is, “How to respond to a country that is helping to destabilize its neighbors?”

The implications are enormous. Under the absolutist concept of national security and sovereignty, there is no aggression unless it is blatantly obvious, or can be proved legally, that uniformed forces of one country have forcefully moved into the national territory of another.

Now we understand that an aggressor may not necessarily be a recognized military entity. The enemy could become the state itself or a nonstate actor that plans and implements the kind of direct or indirect, lethal or nonlethal, or military or nonmilitary activity that subverts stability in other countries. The associated question for the Western Hemisphere is, “How to operationalize a rule-based system and make multilateral security a reality?”

*The Second Level.* The second level of analysis is that of subnational threats to stability and sovereignty (effective control over what occurs within a given national territory). Subnational threats may be generated by elements operating within a state, but they may also operate between states—and be considered transnational threats. Examples include—but are not limited to—terrorists; insurgents; narco-traffickers; and other organized criminals, populists, warlords, and gangs. The threat, in any case, involves the intent either to control a targeted government politically, or to change radically or destroy

a given nation-state. In these terms, a nonstate actor can do what has already been done in at least two Mexican states and one Brazilian state, as follows:

If the irregular attacker – terrorists, drug cartels, criminal gangs, militant religious fundamentalists, or a combination of such nonstate actors – blends crime, terrorism, and war, he can extend his already significant influence. After embracing advanced weaponry, including Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD] (including chemical and biological agents), radio frequency weapons, and advanced intelligence gathering technology, along with more common weapons systems and technology, the attacker can transcend drug running, robbery, kidnapping, and murder and pose a significant challenge to the nation-state and its institutions.

Then, using complicity, intimidation, corruption, and indifference, the irregular attacker can quietly and subtly co-opt individual politicians and bureaucrats and gain political control of a given geographical or political enclave. Such corruption and distortion can potentially lead to the emergence of a network of government protection of illicit activities, and the emergence of a virtual criminal state or political entity. A series of networked enclaves could, then, become a dominant political actor within a state or group of states. Thus, rather than violently competing with a nation-state, an irregular attacker can criminally co-opt and seize control of the state.<sup>51</sup>

Additionally, it is important to note that this second level of analysis would include proxies or surrogates of other countries. Many of the “Wars of National Liberation” and “People’s Wars” that were fought all over the world during the so-called Cold War are good examples of this phenomenon. In this context, it is important to note that, at a Forum on Fourth-Generation of Warfare and Asymmetric War, held in Caracas, Venezuela, in early 2004, President Chávez directed the armed forces to develop a new military doctrine for contemporary conflict: “I call upon everybody to start an . . . effort to apprehend . . . the ideas, concepts, and doctrine of asymmetric war.”<sup>52</sup> This move has provided the conceptual basis upon which Venezuela might use all available networks – political, economic, social, informational, and military – to convince a targeted government’s decisionmakers and population that their present political situation is not legitimate and is hopeless. The development of doctrine for conduct of contemporary asymmetric war – and the accompanying publicity –

was also intended to be a clear signal to the rest of Latin America and the United States that it would be only a matter of time before the Bolivarian Revolution (*bolivarianismo*) prevails.<sup>53</sup>

The corollary, again, has to do with the general possibility of Venezuela helping to destabilize selected parts of Latin America by funneling money and other support to various nonstate actors. More specifically, one should consider the ramifications for stability and security, given the possibility of Venezuelan money, technology, and arms being provided to radical movements and insurgent groups throughout Central and South America. Probably the most salient example of regional destabilization would be the possibility of Venezuelan support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. And the question that plagued the West and its relations with the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War and continues into this contemporary situation is, "How to respond to a country that might be helping to change others through revolutionary means?" Also, "How to respond to a country that is helping legal political parties or movements—such as Nicaraguan Sandinistas and Bolivian and Ecuadorian populists—that are operating in democracies?" A closely associated question is, "What are the most effective means to help a country targeted for *bolivarianismo* to resist the revolutionary appeal?"

The implications at this second level of analysis are daunting. Given the interrelated, multidimensional, multiorganizational, and multinational nature of contemporary conflict, security and stability are too big and too important to remain relegated either to the military or the police of a single nation. It is a nation-state problem, and must be addressed in a unified manner by *all* the instruments of state power. At the same time, most subnational threats to security and sovereignty are supported by transnational actions. Transnational threats require transnational (multilateral) responses. Thus, a targeted nation's security and stability are also problems for the regional and global communities. Another highly relevant question concerning hemispheric security is, "How can the nation-state and the multilateral community, together, generate a combination of military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal, informational, and moral capabilities adequate to combat contemporary asymmetric, fourth-generation threats?"

*The Third Level.* The third level of analysis involves the personal security and well-being of the individual citizen. It then extends to protection of the entire population from violent, internal nonstate actors and external enemies—and, perhaps in some cases, from repressive internal (local and regional) governments. The individual security problem ends with the establishment of perceived firm but fair control of the entire national territory and the people in it. In these terms, it is helpful to think of human perpetrators of insecurity and violence as tertiary threats to individual security. Root causes—poverty; lack of basic human services; and corrupt, underperforming, or nonexistent government security institutions within the national territory—must be recognized as secondary threats. The inability or unwillingness of government to address secondary and tertiary threats must be understood as the primary (the most fundamental) threat. As a result, strategic planners and decisionmakers must contemplate all the levels of threat in dealing with individual security matters.<sup>54</sup>

The corollary takes us back to the problems of assessing democracy and nonintervention, as well as subnational, national, and regional instability in Venezuela and throughout the Latin American region. Associated questions involve the circular nature of the interdependent relationships among personal and collective security, stability, development, peace, prosperity, and democracy, and, “How to respond to these core human issues?”

In the context of the Latin American security dialogue, the most important implication of the third-level personal security component of the contemporary conflict spectrum is the issue of achieving a balanced socioeconomic development with freedom and security. Experience throughout the world and over time clearly indicates that the inability or unwillingness of a government to perform its fundamental governance and personal security functions leads to failing or failed state status.<sup>55</sup> Clearly, many of the problems integral to the failing state process have their origins in weak or inadequate institutions that result in poor or thuggish responses to issues ranging from poverty to street gangs to organized crime. Thus, the question here is, “How to strengthen state institutions as they attempt perform their legitimate governance and security functions?”



*The Fourth Level.* Finally, at the fourth global level of analysis, much of the international community is involved in securing the benefits of global integration. The keys to those benefits are security and stability. A multipolar world in which one or a hundred state and nonstate actors are exerting differing types and levels of power within a set of cross-cutting alliances is volatile and dangerous. As a consequence, the countries and peoples that expect the benefits of global stability must understand and cope with the threats imposed by the new global security environment, think outside the proverbial hemispheric “box,” and make a contribution—however small—to world stability.

At the same time, President Chávez’s approach to Latin American security and stability requires a realignment from capitalist and “neo-liberal” economics and politics to his socialism for the 21st century. That realignment will likely generate instability, conflict, and probably exacerbate the processes of state failure in important parts of the hemisphere. Thus, the corollary at this level must address questions associated with “peacekeeping,” “stability operations,” “nation-building,” and “state failure.”

The implications are straightforward. In the contemporary security environment, international organizations such as the UN and the OAS, and individual national powers, increasingly are being called on to respond to conflict generated by all kinds of material instabilities and human destabilizers. Likewise, the global community increasingly is being asked to respond to failing and failed states. In these terms, it is important to remember that state failure is a process, not an outcome. It is a process by which a state loses the capacity and/or the will to perform its essential legitimizing governance and security functions. In either case, the associated question is “How should the processes of state failure be addressed before they run their courses and achieve conflict and/or crisis proportions?”

## **Conclusions from the Four Levels of Analysis.**

Chávez understands that every player in the international community from small powers to the U.S. superpower must cope simultaneously with four separate and potentially grave types of

contemporary threat. These threats include, first, traditional and lingering boundary and territorial disputes, as well as balance of power concerns. Second, each protagonist must deal with the very real possibility that transnational and internal nonstate actors can be used by one nation-state to play serious roles in destabilizing and taking down another. Additionally, destabilizing nontraditional internal public and personal security threats can be seen all over the hemisphere in ungoverned territories, urban criminal gangs, more conventional terrorism, and insurgency. At the same time, real threats to effective sovereignty exist, stemming from chronic poverty, disease, and other “root causes” of conflict. Accordingly, all of the above types of threats are seen as methods of choice – or areas for exploitation – for various commercial (narco-traffickers and organized criminals), ideological (insurgencies such as Peru’s *Sendero Luminoso*) movements, and *caudillos* like Chávez who are completely and ruthlessly dedicated to achieving control or radical change in a given nation-state. Nevertheless, rather than considering each level of conflict as an independent form of warfare, Chávez finds that it is more useful to think of them as parts within his concept of total war, a people’s war, or a super insurgency.<sup>56</sup>

The questions associated with the corollaries and implications of each of the above levels of analysis, thus, imply no easy set of tasks. However, if the United States and the other countries of the Americas ignore what is happening in the region, that inaction could destroy the democracy, free market economies, and prosperity that has been achieved, and place the posterity of the hemisphere at serious risk.

## **SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ON CHÁVEZ’S ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICT AS A CHALLENGE TO HEMISPHERIC SECURITY**

Chávez may be a military *caudillo*, but he is no “nut case.” He is, in fact, what Ralph Peters calls a “wise competitor.”<sup>57</sup> He will not even attempt to defeat his enemies on their terms. Rather, he will seek to shift the playing field away from conventional military confrontations and turn to nontraditional forms of assault on a nation’s stability and integrity. Thus, it appears that this astute warrior is prepared to destabilize, to facilitate the processes of state failure, and thus to “destroy in order to rebuild” in true revolutionary

fashion.<sup>58</sup> As a consequence, it is important to understand that Chávez considers three issues to be key to success (or failure) in contemporary asymmetric conflict. They are closely related to his security scheme, social programs, and communications efforts. First, he understands the sophistication and complexity of war as a whole. He also understands the value of facilitating the processes of state failure to achieve the objectives of *bolivarianismo*. Finally, Chávez understands the centrality of relative moral legitimacy in conflict—and the critical importance of creating popular perceptions that his cause is morally correct, and will lead to a better life. These are the bases of power—all else, to him, is illusion.

### **The Sophistication and Complexity of War as a Whole.**

Chávez understands that contemporary nontraditional war is *not* a kind of appendage (a lesser or limited thing) to the more comfortable conventional military attrition and maneuver warfare paradigms. It is a great deal more. Again, it may be military or nonmilitary, lethal or nonlethal, or a mix of everything within a state's or a coalition of states' array of instruments of power. As such, it may be a zero-sum game in which only one winner emerges or, in a worst-case scenario, no winner. It is, thus, total. That is to say, the "battlefield" is extended to everyone, everything, and everywhere.<sup>59</sup>

To give the mind as much room as possible to contemplate the sophistication and complexity—and the totality—of contemporary conflict, two Chinese colonels, Liang and Xiangsui, have provided a scenario that is instructive and sobering:

If the attacking side secretly musters large amounts of capital without the enemy nation being aware of this, and launches a sneak attack against its financial markets, then after causing a financial crisis, buries a computer virus and hacker detachment in the opponent's computer system in advance, while at the same time carrying out a network attack against the enemy so that the civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, financial transaction network, telephone communications network, and mass media network are completely paralyzed, this will cause the enemy nation to fall into social panic, street riots, and a political crisis. There is finally the forceful bearing down by the army, and military means are utilized in gradual stages until the enemy is forced to sign a dishonorable peace treaty.<sup>60</sup>

Chávez understands all this. He understands that war is no longer limited to using military violence to bring about desired political change. Rather, all means that can be brought to bear on a given situation must be used to compel a targeted government to do one's will. This *caudillo* will tailor his campaign to his adversaries' political and economic vulnerabilities, and to their psychological precepts. And this is the basis of Chávez's instruction to the Venezuelan armed forces (at the "1st Military Forum on Fourth Generation War and Asymmetric War" in 2004) to develop a doctrinal paradigm change from conventional to people's war.<sup>61</sup>

### **The Issue of State Failure.**

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host "evil" networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as *Bolivarianismo*. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.<sup>62</sup>

Peru's *Sendero Luminoso* calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure "armed propaganda." Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities "business incentives." Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring

about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.<sup>63</sup> Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors' strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime's credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez's intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments' ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.<sup>64</sup>

But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people's democracies. In connection with the creation of new people's democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people's democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.<sup>65</sup>

### **The Centrality of Moral Legitimacy in Contemporary Conflict.**

North American and other Western observers attempting to assess and prescribe the best for a government or a people often fail to understand that their perception of freedom, equality, or economic viability may differ significantly from the perceptions of people living in other cultures. Chávez, however, understands that recognizing this essential difference in perceptions is central to the capability of assessing and developing strategies for contemporary

asymmetric conflict. Thus, as noted above, the umbrella concept of *bolivarianismo* centers on the challenge to a government's moral right to govern. The basis for this challenge is rooted in the belief that the current governmental system is not providing, and cannot or will not provide, the necessary balance among equality, freedom, security, and prosperity for the people, and that the challenger's political philosophy and system are truly representative. Chávez's direct democracy is the philosophy and method that will provide that balance.<sup>66</sup>

Chávez's *bolivarianismo* also includes the concept that people's perception of good and bad and right and wrong is the hub of all movement and power on which virtually everything depends. That is, moral legitimacy is the primary center of gravity in Latin America. Following the logic of the former leader of Peru's *Sendero Luminoso*, Abmael Guzman, Chávez has identified the lack of legitimacy of all governments since the Spanish conquest as the center of gravity in the ongoing conflict in Latin America.<sup>67</sup> The strategic objective, then, must be to break the power of the foreign-dominated and undemocratic governing oligarchy, and to form a new legitimately democratic political entity. In this context, all past and present regimes are judged to be the equivalent of "occupying powers." *Bolivarianismo* is considered to be a kind of "resistance movement" that will conduct a true people's war to replace the illegitimate occupying regime, and liberate the country. In these terms, protagonists can and must persuade and coerce the people into supportive actions.<sup>68</sup>

Importantly and interestingly, in *bolivarianismo* (socialism for the 21st century), a closely related Marxist-Leninist notion is that all means justify the socialist end. As such, elimination or neutralization of anyone and everything opposing that ultimate objective can be rationalized as legitimate.<sup>69</sup> This is a very convenient philosophy for someone like Chávez to adopt. He can garner outside support, while at the same time pursuing all means from propaganda to terrorism to drug trafficking to total destruction of a targeted society to accomplish his goals.

The problem is to convince the people that the use of coercion and violence is necessary – and, thus, morally correct. So he is engaged, through his communications program, in a full-scale "propaganda war" aimed directly at people in the streets of Caracas, Quito, Lima,

La Paz, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and elsewhere. The intent is to persuade as many people as possible that the use of coercion and violence to replace illegitimate occupying regimes is necessary to establish morally correct Latin American democracy and *grandeza*. And, Chávez expects that this campaign will be decisive in determining the long-term outcome of the overall campaign to establish his model of socialism for the 21st century throughout the Latin American region.<sup>70</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

Chávez understands contemporary asymmetric warfare. He understands that this type of conflict requires more than weaponry and technology. It requires lucid and incisive thinking, resourcefulness, determination, imagination, and a certain disregard for convention. The promulgation of such a concept requires a somewhat different approach to conflict than that generally used by the United States over the past several years. That is, Chávez's strategic paradigm outlined above acknowledges that the ultimate outcome of any asymmetric war is not determined primarily by the skillful manipulation of violence in the many military battles that take place once a war of this nature is recognized to have begun. Rather, control of the situation and ultimate success is determined by 1) the sophisticated political-psychological application of all the instruments of power; 2) the skillful exploitation of the processes of state failure to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish socialism for the 21st century; and 3) the level of moral legitimacy the communications/propaganda campaign generates. To the extent that these factors are strongly present in any given strategy, they favor success. To the extent that any one component of the model is absent, or only present in a weak form, the probability of success is minimal.

The above outline takes us back to where we began. It provides the basis for the understanding and judgment that civilian and military leaders must have to be clear on what the situation *is* in Venezuela and what it *is not*. The hard evidence over time underscores the wisdom of Clausewitz's dictum, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching

act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”<sup>71</sup> Chávez’s asymmetric war challenge is, thus, straightforward. Colonel Thomas X. Hammes reminds us that this kind of war is the only kind of war the United States has ever lost.<sup>72</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Asymmetric and irregular opponents are not invincible. They can be controlled and defeated, but only by coherent, patient action that encompasses all agencies of a targeted government and its international allies. That kind of action would include the fields of politics, diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and economic and social development. These efforts must be organized as a network rather than in the traditional vertical, top-down bureaucracies of most governments. Accomplishing such efforts will require fundamental changes in how governmental leaders and personnel at all levels are trained, developed, promoted, deployed, and employed. Additionally, this interagency and multilateral process must exert its collective influence for the entire duration of the conflict—from initial planning to the final achievement of a sustainable peace.<sup>73</sup>

The primary challenge, then, is to come to terms with the pressing need to shift from a singular military-police approach to a multidimensional and multinational paradigm for contemporary asymmetric conflict. That, in turn, requires a strategic-level conceptual framework and a supporting organizational structure to promulgate unified civil-military planning and the implementation of transnational responses to transnational threats. Given today’s realities, failure to prepare adequately for present and future asymmetric contingencies is unconscionable. At least five *fundamental* educational and organizational imperatives are needed to implement the challenges noted above.

- Civilian and military leaders at all levels must learn the fundamental nature of subversion and insurgency, with particular reference to the way in which military and nonmilitary, lethal and nonlethal, and direct and indirect



force can be employed to achieve political ends. Leaders must also understand the ways in which political-psychological considerations affect the use of force – and the ways in which force affects political-psychological efforts.

- Civilian and military personnel are expected to be able to operate effectively and collegially in coalitions or multinational contingents. They must also acquire the ability to deal collegially with civilian populations and local and global media. As a consequence, efforts that enhance interagency as well as international cultural awareness – such as civilian and military exchange programs, language and cultural training programs, and combined (multinational) exercises – must be revitalized and expanded.
- Leaders must learn that an intelligence capability several steps beyond the present norm is required for irregular and asymmetric wars. This capability also must include active utilization of intelligence operations as a dominant element of both strategy and tactics.
- Nonstate political actors in any kind of intrastate conflict are likely to have at their disposal an awesome array of conventional and unconventional technology and weaponry. The “savage wars of peace” have placed and will continue to place military forces and civilian support contingents into harm’s way. Thus, leadership development programs must prepare “peacekeepers” to be effective war fighters.
- Governments and international organizations (for example, the OAS) must restructure themselves to the extent necessary to establish the appropriate political mechanisms to achieve an effective unity of effort. The intent is to ensure that the application of the various civil-military instruments of power directly contributes to a mutually agreed-upon political end-state.

These conceptual and organizational challenges and tasks are the basic realities of 21st century conflict. Long lists of additional recommendations will be irrelevant if the strategic-level foundational

requirements listed above are not implemented first. One of Carl von Clausewitz's translators, Michael Howard, warned years ago: "If [the political-psychological struggle] is not conducted with skill and based on realistic analysis . . . no amount of operational expertise, logistical back-up, or technical know-how could possibly help."<sup>74</sup> The consequences of failing to take the strategic political-psychological effort seriously are clear. Unless thinking, actions, and organization are reoriented at the highest levels to deal with asymmetric knowledge-based information and technology realities, the problems of global, regional, and subregional stability and security will resolve themselves – and not likely for the better.

## ENDNOTES

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18. *Ibid.* Also see Steve Ellner, “Revolutionary and Non-Revolutionary Paths of Radical Populism: Directions of the Chávez Movement in Venezuela,” *Science and Society*, April 2005, pp. 160-190.

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20. Alvaro Vargas Llosa, “The Return of Latin America’s Left,” *New York Times*, March 22, 2005. Also see comments attributed to General James T. Hill, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, in Rudi Williams, “SOUTHCOM Faces Threats to Peace in Latin America, Caribbean,” American Forces Press Service, March 31, 2004.

21. Tom Friedman has written extensively and eloquently on globalization and its implications. See, for example, Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York: Anchor Books, 1999. Also see Alvin Toffler, *Power Shift*, New York: Bantam Books, 1990.

22. *Ibid.*

23. "Special Report: Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," *The Economist*, May 14–20, 2005, pp. 23–24.

24. See, as examples, De Tocqueville, Locke, Rousseau, and Maritain.

25. Author interviews with nonattribution in Miami, March 10, 2005.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Paulo Sotereo, of the Brazilian daily, *O Estado de São Paulo*, quoting from an interview with former President Cardozo, in an interview with the author in Washington, DC, February 17, 2005.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Consensus statement from a conference on "Southern Cone Security," sponsored by the Office of External Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR, U.S. Department of State, in Washington, DC, July 8, 2005. Also see Julio A. Cirino, "La Revolución Mundial pasa por Hugo Chávez", Part 1, in *Panorama*, April 20, 2005, and Part 2, April 27, 2005; and "Chvez le mete mass presion a Latinamerica, y a USA," *Urgente 24*, August 11, 2005.

30. *Ibid.* Also see *The Economist*, *Financial Times*, *El Universal*, and *La Voz*.

31. *Ibid.*

32. These are terms Chávez uses interchangeably.

33. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, *Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, pp. 5–6.

34. Consensus statement from July 2005 conference in Washington, DC. Also see Max G. Manwaring, *Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005, p. 8.

35. Steven Metz, "Relearning Counterinsurgency," a panel discussion at the American Enterprise Institute, January 10, 2005. Also see Paul E. Smith, *On Political War*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989.

36. Interviews and *The Economist*, May 14–20, 2005.

37. *Ibid.* Also see *Financial Times*, *El Universal*, *La Voz*, and Stephen Johnson, "South America's Mad-TV: Hugo Chávez Makes Broadcasting a Battleground," *The Heritage Foundation Policy Research & Analysis*, August 10, 2005.

38. *Ibid.*; and *El Universal*, January 5, 2005; *El Universal*, March 8, 2005; *Europa Press*, April 3, 2005; *La Voz*, April 3, 2005; *El Universal*, April 8, 2005.

39. Consensus statement from March 2005 conference, Coral Gables, FL.

40. For a good discussion of this set of points, see Thomas A. Marks, "Ideology of Insurgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold War Distortions?" *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Spring 2004, pp. 107–109.

41. Juan Dorero, "No. 1 Quits in Bolivia, and Protesters Scorn Nos. 2 and 3," *New York Times*, June 9, 2005; and "New Bolivia Leader Promises Early Election," *Global Security News & Reports*, June 10, 2005.

42. Roger Noriega, "Remarks," October 28, 2004.

43. A good explanation of absolutism is provided in Maritain, pp. 12-19.

44. To be fair, it must be noted that some scholars and journalists are beginning to understand this problem and are writing in these terms. See, as three examples, Anthony T. Bryan, *Transnational Organized Crime: The Caribbean Context*, Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Press, 2002; Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997; and "El delito como una amenaza geopolítica," in *Clarín.com*, 3 de Julio de 2003. Related international relations theory may be found in Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997; and Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in Krause and Williams, 1997, pp. 121-146.

45. While it does not show many of the problems Kaplan points up, one published map does emphasize this particular point. See "World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2001/2002," prepared by PIOOM for IIMCR with the support of the Goals for Americans Foundation, St. Louis, June 2003. It should also be noted that this idea was articulated by Robert D. Kaplan, in "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, pp. 72-76; and Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy*, New York: Random House, 2000, pp. 3-57.

46. As an example of this discussion, see Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*, 5th ed., Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 3-46. Also see Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, eds., *National Security and American Society*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973, p. 47; and Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 143-330.

47. Consensus statement from the Conference on "Charting New Approaches to Defense and Security Challenges in the Western Hemisphere," cosponsored by the Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, in Coral Gables, FL, March 9-11, 2005.

48. Max G. Manwaring, Conference Brief, "Charting New Approaches to Defense and Security Challenges in the Western Hemisphere," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and the Latin American and Caribbean Studies Center of Florida International University, March 2005.

49. *Financial Times*, "Chávez Threatens to Cut All Ties with Colombia," at <http://news.ft.com/cms/s/1db6dd82-6e37-11d9-a60a-00000e2511c8.html>.

50. Jack Child, *Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors*, New York: Praeger, 1985, pp. 58–60.
51. Manwaring, *Gangs*, p. 17.
52. This charge to the National Armed Forces (FAN) was made before an audience gathered in the Military Academy auditorium for the 1st Military Forum on Fourth Generation War and Asymmetric War, Caracas, reported in *El Universal*, April 8, 2005.
53. In January 2005, General Melvin Lopez Hidalgo, Secretary of the Venezuelan Defense Council, stated publicly that Venezuela was changing its security doctrine in order to better confront “la amenaza permanente de los Estados Unidos” and that a document entitled *Pueblo en Armas* had been published that confirmed the primary military principles of President Chávez, noted above. Reported in *Panorama*, April 27, 2005.
54. Consensus statement from March 2005 conference in Coral Gables, FL.
55. Daniel C. Esty, Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, and Pamela T. Surko, “The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning,” in *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.
56. This concept is not new. Mao Tse-tung and General Vo Nguyen Giap used it in China and Vietnam, and General Sir Frank Kitson developed the idea a bit further in his *Warfare as a Whole*, London: Faber and Faber, 1987.
57. Ralph Peters, “Constant Conflict,” *Parameters*, Summer 1997, p. 10. Also see “The Culture of Conflict,” *Parameters*, Winter 1995, pp. 18-27.
58. Consensus statement from March 2005 conference in Coral Gables, FL.
59. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999, p. 109.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
61. Author interviews with nonattribution in Miami, FL, March 10, 2005, and a consensus statement from the conference on July 8, 2005. Hereafter noted as Author interviews.
62. Chester A. Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2003, pp. 32-44.
63. Author interviews.
64. *Ibid.*
65. *Ibid.*; and Crocker. Also see Robert H. Dorff, “Strategy, Grand Strategy, and the Search for Security,” in Max G. Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, and Robert H. Dorff, *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the 21st Century*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, pp. 127-140; David C. Jordan, *Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies*, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999; and Eduardo

Pizarro and Ana Maria Bejarano, "Colombia: A Failing State?" *ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America*, Spring 2003, pp. 1-6.

66. Author interviews.

67. *Ibid.* Also see Abimael Guzman, "El Discurso del Dr. Guzman," in *Los partidos politicos en el Peru*, Rogger U. Mercado, ed., Lima: Ediciones Latinamericanas, 1985, pp. 85-90; Comité Central del partido Comunista del Peru, *Desarrollar la guerra popular sirviendo a la revolucion mundial*, Lima: Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Peru, 1986, pp. 82-88.

68. *Ibid.*

69. *Ibid.*

70. *Ibid.*

71. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 88.

72. Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, "4th Generation Warfare," *Armed Forces Journal*, November 2004, pp. 40-44.

73. Roger Noriega, "Remarks."

74. Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 109.